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NOTE
INTERSTATE BURDENS AND
ANTITRUST FEDERALISM: A REEXAMINATION OF PARKER
IMMUNITY
JOHN SACK∗
INTRODUCTION
The Sherman Act has been described as the “Magna Carta” of the
American economic system.1 Since 1890, it has been used to punish
individuals and corporations that engage in unreasonable restraints of
trade.2 The Act has been described as the Bill of Rights for American
economic liberties.3 And as the Constitution sought to build a Union of
States, the Sherman Act should seek to build a unified national
economy. Although the Sherman Act has been successful in policing
the U.S. economy, it has not been without its critics.4 Specifically, the per
se immunity for certain state-created monopolies has been widely
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1. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (scrutinizing certain price restrictions under rule of reason analysis).
3. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(“[A]ntitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free
enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our freeenterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal
freedoms.”); see also United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 439 (1978) (“Simply put,
the Act has not been interpreted as if it were primarily a criminal statute; it has been construed
to have a ‘generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional
provisions.’”).
4. See generally Fed. Trade Comm’n, Office of Policy Planning, Report of the State Action
Task Force (2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/report-state-actiontask-force-recommendations-clarify-and-reaffirm-original-purposes-stateaction/stateactionreport_0.pdf [hereinafter Task Force Report]. I will refer to the doctrine as
“state action immunity” and “Parker immunity,” as the Court has.
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criticized.5 Despite the criticism, the doctrine has remained largely
unchanged since its inception in Parker v. Brown nearly eighty years
ago.6 One of the Parker doctrine’s most common critiques is its failure
to consider the interstate burdens state-implemented restraints can
create.7 Although the U.S. federal system must permit states to regulate
within a wide berth, state-created restraints erect the same barriers that
the Sherman Act sought to eliminate.8
Despite the Parker doctrine’s faults, it still serves a valuable
purpose in respecting the federal balance, and it “embod[ies] in the
Sherman Act the federalism principle that the States possess a
significant measure of sovereignty under our Constitution.”9 Even
though the Court has declined to revisit the doctrine, the development
of the Court’s commerce clause jurisprudence and its new
understanding of federalism require a revision of the Parker doctrine.10
Specifically, courts should balance the interstate effects and
potential for collective action problems with the state’s interest in the
regulation. Although states should have the authority to regulate
conduct inside their boundaries, this authority should not be extended
to create economic conditions that burden neighbor states or the nation
as a whole. Once the federalism motivations behind the Parker doctrine
disappear, all that is left is a restraint on trade. A state wishing to create
interstate friction and promote economic insularism should not receive
immunity to do so.
Part I will first outline the doctrine, from its beginnings in Parker v.
Brown to its modern doctrinal framework. Part II will then discuss the
rationale behind the doctrine, ranging from Congress’s understanding
of the Commerce Clause and federalism in 1890 to the modern
justifications. The state’s role in regulation plays a large part in why the
doctrine survives, because holding a state liable for all of its regulation,
as the Sherman Act would otherwise require, would effectively destroy
the state’s power to regulate altogether.11 Part III will expound
critiques of the doctrine. Scholars have long voiced concerns about the
5. Id.
6. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
7. Task Force Report, supra note 4, at 40–44.
8. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 350 (assuming that the raisin prorate program at issue would be
illegal if done by private parties).
9. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 574 U.S. 494, 503 (2015).
10. See Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007) (stating
that developments in economic conditions counsel an evolving view of the Sherman Act).
11. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 133 (1978).
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doctrine and whether it comports with the principles of federalism.
Furthermore, Part IV will propose solutions, along with their respective
costs and benefits. Namely, this paper will argue that the best solution
is to allow the Sherman Act to preempt state action when state action
creates excessive interstate conflict. It is a constitutional goal to
promote harmony among the states, minimize interstate burdens, and
discourage isolationism and favoritism.12 The Constitution strives to
create a more perfect political union, and in that same spirit the
Sherman Act should strive to create a more perfect economic union as
well.13
I. DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND
A. General Overview
The Sherman Act prohibits unreasonable restraints on trade,
whether by a single individual or a combination of competitors.14
Analysis of possible Sherman Act violations typically proceeds on a
case-by-case basis, employing the “rule of reason” to determine
whether a restraint of trade is unreasonable or if it has sufficient procompetitive effects to be ruled valid.15 All restraints on trade fall under
the purview of the Sherman Act, as long as the restraint affects
interstate commerce and does not otherwise qualify for immunity.16
The Sherman Act’s scope has broadened greatly since its passage in
1890. In 1890, Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause was
interpreted narrowly.17 Just two years prior to the passing of the
Sherman Act, the Court held in Kidd v. Pearson that even though a
manufacturer’s output was eventually sold in several other states, he
was not involved in interstate commerce.18 The Court explicitly
constrained the reach of the Sherman Act in United States v. E.C. Knight

12. United Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of Camden Cnty. & Vicinity v. Mayor & Council
of City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 220 (1984).
13. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 574 U.S. 494, 502 (2015)
(describing federal antitrust law as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our
free enterprise system).
14. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“[T]his Court has long recognized that
Congress intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints.”).
15. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606–07 (1972).
16. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102 (1980); see,
e.g., McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15 (1976) (granting federal antitrust immunity
for the “business of insurance”) (repealed 2021).
17. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20 (1888).
18. Id. at 22–23 (1888).
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Co.19 In E.C. Knight, the American Sugar Refining Company had
sought to acquire a number of sugar manufacturing plants, granting it
near complete control of the United States sugar market.20 However,
the Court held that manufacturing sugar was not interstate commerce,
as the Court drew a formal line between the “manufactur[ing]” of a
good and the “disposition” of that same good.21 This distinction would
not last.
The Court ended that distinction in Wickard v. Filburn.22 The
appellee owned a small farm in Ohio, part of which was a small acreage
of wheat.23 He objected to penalties imposed by a federal wheat quota,
arguing that Congress lacked the power under the Commerce Clause
to regulate his entire wheat crop because a portion of his wheat did not
enter interstate commerce.24 However, the Court held that the
Commerce Clause granted Congress the power to regulate any activity,
the aggregate of which exerts a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.25 The Court cast away old formalist distinctions between
“direct” and “indirect” effects on interstate commerce, and instead
adopted a functionalist approach that expanded Congress’s regulatory
authority.26
Wickard v. Filburn’s expansion of Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause extended to the Sherman Act as well.27 As it
pertained to the Sherman Act, “[t]he artificial and mechanical
separation of ‘production’ and ‘manufacturing’ from ‘commerce,’
without regard to their economic continuity, . . . no longer suffice[d] to
put either production or manufacturing and refining processes beyond
reach of Congress’ authority or of the statute.”28
The substance of the Sherman Act has changed over time as well.
Even Justice Scalia, well-known for his formalist, textualist reading of
statutes, understood that the Sherman Act not only invoked the
common law term “restraint of trade” as it was understood in 1890, but
the common law itself.29 Federal courts handling antitrust issues behave
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

156 U.S. 1 (1895).
Id. at 9.
Id. at 12.
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
Id.at 114.
Id. at 113–14.
Id. at 127–28.
Id. at 125–26.
Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229 (1948).
Id.
Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988).
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more like common-law courts than most other areas governed by
federal statutes.30 The term “restraint[s] of trade” evolves as courts
adapt to modern understanding and greater experience, and as the
nature of economic conditions change.31 The main method of
interpretation under the Sherman Act, the rule of reason, shirks formal
categorization of certain types of conduct and instead proceeds on a
case-by-case basis, examining whether the conduct at issue is
unreasonably anti-competitive.32 This functional analysis further
confirms the adaptability of the Sherman Act: Instead of being bound
by formalist categories, the court may assess the conduct at hand and
analyze its anti-competitive effects within the greater context of the
national economy.33 This formulation allows the Sherman Act to
change as economic conditions change, and, as new problems arise,
courts are empowered to interpret the Sherman Act to adapt to new
problems.34
B. Genesis of the State Immunity Doctrine: Parker v. Brown
The state action immunity doctrine, which insulates states from
liability under the Sherman Act, began with Parker v. Brown.35 In 1940,
California enacted a program restricting the amount of raisins that each
producer could sell on the open market, seeking to “conserve the
agricultural wealth of the state.”36 Under the program, producers were
required to give their entire crop to the state, who would then classify
and store seventy percent of the raisins, allowing farmers to only sell
thirty percent of the crop they intended to market.37 The Court
assumed for the sake of argument that this arrangement would violate
the Sherman Act if undertaken by private businesses.38 Appellee, a
raisin farmer, challenged the validity of the program under both the
Sherman Act and the Commerce Clause.
The Court held that the Sherman Act did not apply to California’s

30. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 98 n.42 (1981).
31. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007).
32. See id. at 885–86.
33. Id. at 899–900.
34. Id.
35. 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943).
36. Id. at 346.
37. Id. at 348.
38. Id. at 350 (“We may assume for present purposes that the California prorate program
would violate the Sherman Act if it were organized and made effective solely by virtue of a
contract, combination or conspiracy of private persons, individual or corporate.”).
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prorate program for raisin production.39 The arrangement never
operated by force of individual agreement or combination of
agreements, but was specifically enacted by the state legislature.40 The
Court noted that nothing in the Sherman Act’s text suggested that its
purpose was to restrain a state or its officers from acting under
legislative directive.41 Further, the legislative history of the bill showed
that it was never intended to reach state-created restraints of trade. The
Sherman Act’s sponsor declared that it would only prevent “business
combinations.”42 In fact, the legislative history bears no mention of
state action; rather, legislators were focused solely on private conduct.43
Beyond Parker’s statutory holding, important concerns about
federalism also underlaid the Court’s decision to insulate state action
from antitrust scrutiny. State regulation often restricts trade to achieve
a public goal. For example, cities may use restrictive zoning, or a state
may have mandatory licensing laws that could reasonably qualify as
restraints of trade.44 Federal antitrust law broadly prohibits such
conduct among private actors,45 and although federal law is supreme
over state law, the Sherman Act never meant to displace the state’s
sovereign power to regulate within its borders.46
States are presumed competent to regulate local conduct, but in the
wake of Wickard v. Filburn, the scope of both Congress’s commerce
clause and Sherman Act powers expanded.47 Faced with the prospect
that numerous state regulations could come within the ambit of the
Sherman Act, the Court in Parker was tasked with how to confront

39. Id. at 352.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 350–51.
42. Id. at 341 (citing 19 Cong. Rec. 6041).
43. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351 (1943).
44. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 439 (1978) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
45. Id.
46. Parker, 341 U.S. at 351–52. The Court also went on to hold that the prorate program did
not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause for two reasons: First, the legislation, which intended
to stabilize the price of raisins, was a matter of both state and national concern. But because
Congress had not acted, it was a solution “peculiarly within the province of the state.” Id. at 367.
The program did not target, nor did it discriminate against, interstate commerce. Rather, the state
merely raised prices and lowered quantities, which impacted interstate commerce only
incidentally. And second, Congress’s implementation of other marketing regulations similar to
the California prorate program demonstrated that Congress had implicitly accepted California’s
regime. Id. at 367–68.
47. See Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976) (“[D]ecisions by
this Court have permitted the reach of the Sherman Act to expand along with expanding notions
of congressional power.”).
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them. The Court first noted that states are sovereign in the American
dual system of federalism, unless the constitution or Congress strips
that power away.48 So because the Sherman Act did not explicitly take
away states’ power to regulate in effectively anti-competitive ways, the
Sherman Act simply could not apply to state conduct.49 The underlying
federalism motivation has continued to develop, and the Court
continues to emphasize that federalism is an important part of the
Parker doctrine.50
C. Modern State Immunity Doctrine
The Court has since developed a more thorough doctrine consistent
with Parker’s original holding. Under the current doctrine, in order to
be entitled to state action immunity, the challenged restraint must first
be “one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy”;
second, the policy must be “actively supervised” by the State itself.51 If
the restraint is managed by a municipality instead of a private party,
only the “clear policy” prong must be satisfied.52
A clearly articulated state policy helps courts to ensure the state is
not merely rubber-stamping a private restraint on trade.53 For example,
in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, a state bar instituting a minimum fee
schedule without any guidance from the Virginia Legislature or the
Virginia Supreme Court was not a “clearly articulated state policy.”54
Nor was Michigan taking a “neutral” stance towards a lamp exchange
program sufficient for antitrust immunity in Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co.55 The nature of the regulation also matters. Activities related to the
“core of the State’s power to protect the public” are more likely to be

48. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 574 U.S. 494, 503
(2015) (re-affirming federalism as an essential factor to the existence of the Parker doctrine); Cal.
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1980) (same); see
also City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415 (1978) (same).
51. Id.
52. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985). The Court did not require
clear articulation because “[o]nce it is clear that state authorization exists, there is no need to
require the State to supervise actively the municipality’s execution of what is a properly delegated
function.” Id. Because cities only exist under the sovereign authority of the state, it is presumed
they act in the public interest and do not need to be supervised. Id.
53. Peter Hettich, Mere Refinement of the State Action Doctrine Will Not Work, 5 DEPAUL
BUS. & COM. L.J. 105, 118–19 (2006) (quoting Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 361
(1977)).
54. 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975).
55. 428 U.S. 579, 598 (1976).
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entitled to immunity, whereas Cantor’s restraint was merely regulating
the additional services an electric company could offer, which is not a
primary government function.56
Additionally, the Court requires “active supervision” of the
regulation by a state to ensure that the restraint is still part of a state’s
sovereign authority.57 If the state is merely shielding private conduct
from the purview of antitrust law, the restraint is not entitled to
immunity.58 It is further assumed that, without the requisite supervision,
there is “no realistic assurance that a private party’s anticompetitive
conduct promotes state policy, rather than merely the party’s individual
interests.”59
These requirements developed as a way to distinguish between a
state managing an anti-competitive restraint and a state effectively
authorizing private actors to violate the Sherman Act. This distinction
helps ensure that anti-competitive conduct comes from a state directive
in the public interest—not simply a private actor using the power of the
state to become a monopoly.60 Unless the state actively observes,
reviews or re-examines the program, the state cloaks otherwise
unlawful, private restraints of trade as state action, immunizing such
restraints from challenge.61 Such a thinly veiled distinction cannot be
justified under the law.62
III. DOCTRINAL CRITICISM
Although the Court has continued to re-affirm Parker v. Brown’s
central holding, many have criticized the Parker doctrine. Both scholars
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have highlighted problems
with the doctrine and offered a number of solutions for how to remedy
its faults.63
The first common critique of the doctrine is that it does not account
for out-of-state economic effects. Unless a regulation runs afoul of
another constitutional barrier, no consideration of interstate spillovers

56. Hettich, supra note 53, at 119.
57. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
58. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 574 U.S. 494, 505 (2015).
59. Patrick v. Burget, 498 U.S. 94, 100–01 (1988).
60. See Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 105–06.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 105.
63. See generally Task Force Report, supra note 4 (describing a number of academic
criticisms of the Parker doctrine).
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applies.64 One need not look farther than Parker itself to see how the
state action doctrine can impose costs on out-of-state residents, even
though those residents have diminished political capital in the state. At
the time Parker was decided, between 90 and 95 percent of raisins
produced in California entered interstate commerce and California
provided almost all of the nation’s raisins.65 Most American raisin
consumers lived outside of California and had no political means to
oppose the state’s legislative program, yet they bore the costs of
California’s state-sanctioned monopoly.66
Second, similar concerns about political representation animate
critiques of Parker immunity. The policy at issue in Parker restricted
output and artificially raised prices, two results federal antitrust law
generally seeks to prohibit.67 Although the benefits of such a program
were borne almost exclusively by California, the costs of the program
were incurred by raisin consumers across the nation.68 The political
incentives to promote such a program follow closely with economic
costs and benefits.69 California raisin producers have a strong incentive
to lobby their own government to install such a program, but it would
be nearly impossible for non-California residents to challenge such a
policy through the normal political channels.70 The government of
California is not the appropriate body to properly weigh the benefits
to in-state raisin producers with the costs to out-of-state consumers, yet
the Parker doctrine grants California per se immunity on federalism
grounds.71 Although the California program was implicitly endorsed by
Congress, one is just as likely to find similar programs with no similar

64. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567–69 (1984) (holding activity by a legislature or
state supreme court is per se immune from antitrust scrutiny with no analysis of out-of-state
effects).
65. Parker, 317 U.S. at 345.
66. See Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Federalism and State Restraints of Interstate Commerce: An
Essay for Professor Hovenkamp, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2161, 2188 (2015) (describing the harms of
the prorate program at issue).
67. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 263 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (“[T]he antitrust laws
are aimed at preventing monopoly profits and price fixing, which gouge the consumer.”).
68. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 345 (describing how most raisins were shipped into interstate
commerce).
69. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action
Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75
TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1235–38 (1997) [hereinafter Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism]; see also
Daniel A. Farber Philip, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 890–901 (1987)
(describing an economic approach to public choice theory).
70. John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV.
713, 724 (1986) (describing the free rider problem).
71. Parker, 317 U.S. at 352 (1943).
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implicit endorsement.72
The U.S. Constitution embodies a system of federalism where the
federal government is sovereign in some respects, and the several states
are sovereign in others.73 This system of federalism gives states the
power to regulate local matters and the federal government the power
to regulate issues that states are less suited to regulate.74 When costs
spill over into other states, the national government becomes the
appropriate body to regulate the costs and benefits of such a program.75
The Court has recognized such spillover effects, and how political
actors, even government entities, can act solely in self-interest.76 Such
state self-interest can directly harm consumers outside of its territorial
jurisdiction.77
Parker immunity, as it stands, runs counter to longstanding ideals of
national unity that harken back to the Founding era. The law has long
prohibited states from imposing excessive costs on the nation as a
whole, solely for the purpose of furthering its own intrastate policy
interests. McCulloch v. Maryland illustrates the Court’s wariness of selfserving state action.78 In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall held that
states may not tax the national bank, as they would be wielding power
against the whole of the United States, even though the whole of the
United States is not represented by each state.79 Similar to a state tax
being problematic since it is the part acting on the whole, anticompetitive restraints by the states would unduly impose costs on the
nation. The people of the United States, acting through Congress,
christened competition and free markets through the Sherman Act.80
72. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102–03
(1980) (describing how Congress repealed legislation granting immunity to the conduct at issue).
73. Gregory Ablavsky, Empire States: The Coming of Dual Federalism, 128 YALE L.J. 1792,
1794–95 (2019) (describing American dual federalism).
74. Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (applying this idea to the treaty power).
75. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory
of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 138 (2010) (describing how interstate externalities
should be handled by federal governments).
76. See City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 404 (1978) (plurality
opinion) (“Moreover, a municipality conceivably might charge discriminatorily higher rates to
such captive customers outside its jurisdiction without a cost-justified basis. Both of these
practices would provide maximum benefits for its constituents, while disserving the interests of
the affected customers.”).
77. Id.
78. 17 U.S. 316 (1819)
79. Id.
80. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (“[T]he Sherman Act was designed
to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered
competition as the rule of trade.”).
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Just as one state could not tax the resources of the United States, one
state should not be allowed to use state policy to burden the national
economy. Because the potential costs to state-created monopolies are
so high,81 federal policy should prohibit states from allocating those
costs beyond their borders. Any state that wishes to impose monopoly
costs outside of its borders to benefit itself and undermine competition
should be carefully scrutinized when it does so. This scrutiny would not
be fatal-in-fact for the legislation, but it should be enough for states to
second-guess an attempt to enrich itself to the detriment of its sister
states.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The Sherman Act, and specifically Parker immunity, should be
interpreted in light of the above concerns. After all, the Sherman Act is
the standard-bearer for the U.S. free market system, and so our
interpretation of it should evolve with our understanding of
constitutional principles and economic conditions.82 Justice Burger’s
concurrence in City of Lafayette elaborates on this point:
Our conceptions of the limits imposed by federalism are bound to
evolve, just as our understanding of Congress’ power under the
Commerce Clause has evolved. Consequently, since we find it
appropriate to allow the ambit of the Sherman Act to expand with
evolving perceptions of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause, a similar process should occur with respect to “state action”
analysis under Parker. That is, we should not treat the result in the
Parker case as cast in bronze; rather, the scope of the Sherman Act’s
power should parallel the developing concepts of American
federalism.83

As states impose costs on each other through state-sanctioned
monopolies, the Court’s understanding of federalism and the
Commerce Clause counsels scrutiny of the Parker doctrine. An entirely
new doctrine is not necessary to curtail Parker immunity. Rather, the
issue can be resolved by applying Parker immunity in light of the
American dual system of federalism and the Commerce Clause.
Modern scholarship critiques the lack of concern for interstate
spillovers. By that token, the modern Parker doctrine fails to account
for economic efficiency and undermines political representation values
81. Meese, supra note 66, at 2188.
82. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
83. 435 U.S. 389, 421 n.2 (Burger, J. concurring).
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meant to be protected by federalism.84 So while scholars almost
universally recognize that interstate economic spillovers are
problematic, there is no consensus on what remedy is most appropriate.
A. Substantive Review of State Regulations
The first of these solutions is to add substantive review of state
regulations. The current doctrine requires only procedural clearance
before a court will grant state action immunity.85 Courts do not inquire
if the regulation is substantively reasonable, nor do courts apply any
“rule of reason” analysis present in most other antitrust cases. Justice
Blackmun proposed a test that would insert a substantive barrier to
claims of immunity: State-sanctioned anticompetitive activity must be
declared void if its potential harms outweigh its benefits.86 His test is a
modified rule of reason analysis. It assesses the justifications for
anticompetitive activity in the same way courts assess justifications in
equal protection cases: where “justifications are at all substantial,” then
a court should not find the restraint unreasonable.87
Justice Blackmun applied his test to the regulation in Cantor. The
anticompetitive practice at issue was an alleged tie of electricity service
and lightbulbs offered by the Detroit Edison Company.88 In this case,
the allege tie was providing, at no cost, new residential customers with
lightbulbs and replacing burned-out bulbs. Detroit Edison’s rates, both
for electricity and the omission of any charge for lightbulbs, had to be
approved by the Michigan Public Service Commission and could not
be changed without the Commission’s approval.89 Detroit Edison
claimed that they had received no profit from the distribution of bulbs,
and stated the intended purpose was to increase the consumption of
electricity.90 On the other hand, the petitioner, a retail druggist selling
light bulbs, claimed that the policy’s real purpose was to foreclose a
substantial portion of the lightbulb market.91 Because the Court only
addressed the applicability of Parker, the Court did not address the
84. Task Force Report, supra note 4, at 44.
85. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 574 U.S. 494, 495 (2015)
(describing the current test).
86. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 610 (1976).
87. Id. at 611.
88. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, Tying the Sale of Two Products, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/tying-sale-two-products
(last visited Mar. 7, 2021) (describing antitrust ties).
89. Cantor, 428 U.S. at 582–83.
90. Id. at 583–84.
91. Id. at 584.
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merits of the underlying antirust claim.92 Nevertheless, in his
concurrence, Justice Blackmun applied a substantive rule of reason
analysis and found the tie to be unreasonably anti-competitive and thus
not entitled to immunity.93 He stated that while the tie originated as a
way to allow people to use more electricity, there were other less
restrictive means to achieve that same result, like a promotional
lightbulb sale.94 Michigan’s interest in the tie—having lightbulbs being
sold by a regulated producer—was rejected as an inadequate state
objective because no evidence suggested that a competitive lightbulb
market created instability or raised any other traditional concerns with
competitive markets.95 In short, Justice Blackmun’s proposed test is
slightly stricter than rational basis review.96
Justice Blackmun’s test offers a number of benefits that the current
Parker doctrine does not account for. First, it would require states to
articulate the intent behind the regulation that abrogates the freemarket scheme. In Cantor, Justice Blackmun took note of the lack of
evidence that the Michigan Public Service Commission had even
considered the light-bulb tie that it had endorsed for the private Detroit
Edison Company to use.97 A state enacting an anti-competitive
regulation or scheme should be incentivized to develop a rich
legislative history in order to properly defend their scheme in court. In
other words, they should have to show that deliberative process led to
the challenged policy. This, in turn, would incline regulators to more
critically review regulations before they are enacted.98 Second, it would
allow courts to stay well within their wheelhouse of antitrust law:
applying the rule of reason. Justice Blackmun’s test is consistent with
the common practice of federal courts in antitrust cases, and the more
specific problem of assessing state interests against federal dictates, also
familiar to federal courts.99 Such a test would allow most legitimate
state restraints to continue lawfully, and only those with significant
competitive harms or no justification at all would be invalidated.
While such a system would address some political concerns about
the doctrine, it does not go far enough to solve federalism concerns
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 581–82.
Id. at 612 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 613.
Id. at 611.
Id. at 610.
Id.
Id. at 612.
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inherent in the modern Parker doctrine. Justice Blackmun’s solution
does not explicitly outline what justifications he would find sufficient
to allow a program to succeed, nor does he explicitly mention what
costs may doom a program. Further, it only connects the state interest
in the regulation to its effectiveness in achieving that objective. Few
courts have engaged in any meaningful analysis as to state policy goals
underlying a restraint on trade, and no analysis goes specifically to the
interstate effects of such a policy.100 However, creating a solution to
address federalism does not involve re-inventing the wheel, as existing
doctrines and proposals can be slightly altered to best police the
doctrine.
B. Dormant Commerce Clause Fills the Gap
Another proposed solution would leave the Parker doctrine
unaltered but instead let the Dormant Commerce Clause handle state
restraints that create spillovers. Dormant Commerce Clause analysis
proceeds in two main ways. First, if a state regulation is facially
discriminatory towards out-of-state commerce, or if it is not
discriminatory on its face but still creates discriminatory effects, it is
virtually per se invalid.101 Such regulations include mandating waste to
be processed in certain in-state facilities,102 prohibiting the importation
of out-of-state waste,103 and prohibiting the exportation of in-state
minnows.104 Only if the regulation has a legitimate objective, and that
objective cannot be achieved by non-discriminatory means, can the
regulation survive.105 Such regulations are not typically challenged in
Parker cases, but restraints on trade could fall into this category.106
Second, if a regulation is nondiscriminatory and its effects on interstate
commerce are incidental, the regulation is valid unless the “burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.”107 This approach has been used to strike down
a number of regulations, including Arizona fruit-labeling
requirements,108 an Illinois statute requiring certain mudguards on
100. Hettich, supra note 53, at 149.
101. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
102. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 386 (1994).
103. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978).
104. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 324–25 (1979).
105. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151–52 (1986) (holding Maine’s restriction on out-of-state
live baitfish valid because no workable alternatives existed to protect Maine’s fisheries).
106. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 466 (2005).
107. Id.
108. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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trailer trucks,109 and an Iowa statute barring long trucks on their
highways.110 However, this analysis has rather lenient results when state
action merely “affects” interstate commerce but does not explicitly
discriminate against it. 111 This lenient approach is not enough to
appropriately police states that enact anti-competitive schemes that
create interstate burdens.
Academics have developed multiple different methods for
determining how significant a spillover problem must be in order for
the federal government to preempt otherwise valid state regulations.
Judge Frank Easterbrook, prominent Law and Econ Scholar,112
proposed an extreme solution. He proposed that any state regulation
would lose Parker immunity unless the residents of that state bear the
entire monopoly overcharge.113 In his view, “states could have any rules
they want, so long as he who calls the tune also pays the piper.”114 In
other words, a state regulation should only be entitled to Parker
immunity if the state can internalize all of the externalities generated
by a monopoly-creating regulation. However, such approach would
likely eliminate a significant portion of state regulation. Most notably,
such an approach would render the regulations in Parker itself invalid,
as nearly all of the raisins were shipping in interstate commerce.115
Furthermore, that kind of restriction would overly burden certain
industries that rely on exports consumed nationally. For example, a
significant amount of agriculture crosses state lines.116 It cannot be the
case that any restraint on agriculture production would be an
unreasonable restraint of trade. Imposing Easterbrook’s “any effect”
standard would wipe out states’ regulatory authority—especially for
agriculture. On the other hand, Easterbrook’s approach would bode
well for certain local restrictions, such as power companies with limited
territorial reach or specific regulations on intrastate trucking rates.117

109. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
110. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
111. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 367 (1943) (holding the prorate program merely
affected interstate commerce).
CHI.
L.
SCHOOL,
112. Frank
H.
Easterbrook,
UNIV.
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/easterbrook (last visited Feb. 22, 2021).
113. Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23,
45 (1983).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., California Agricultural Exports, https://www.cdfa.ca.gov/statistics/PDFs/201718AgExports.pdf (stating that California’s agricultural exports totaled over $20 billion in 2017).
117. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 50–52.
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Some academics have proposed middle ground approaches. For
example, Alan Meese proposed that the analysis should focus on
whether the restraint truly affects interstate commerce and that
Dormant Commerce Clause preemption should apply only to
anticompetitive state statutes that result in significant spillovers.118
Such a proposal would eliminate most of the tension between federal
antitrust law and local regulation.119 However, such an approach fails
to appreciate the state’s interest in regulation. While Meese’s proposal
focuses on the spillover effects currently neglected by the Parker
doctrine, it fails to give any weight to the state’s interest in regulating.
C. The Middle Ground: A Way Forward
The test proposed here adopts a similar middle ground approach. It
balances the states’ interest in regulation with federal interests in
promoting competition and avoiding economic sectarianism.
Restraints that impose unreasonable costs on out-of-state consumers
should not be entitled to Parker antitrust immunity. Rather, courts
should balance the interstate effects and potential for collective action
problems with the state’s interest in the regulation.120 While a more
formal demarcation of what is and is not permissible would be
desirable, the realities of economics and markets, as well as our original
understanding of the Sherman Act, do not allow for bright-line rules.121
Instead, the Court should use the tools it has already developed in the
antitrust realm to determine whether a state action is immune from
antitrust enforcement.
This proposed test assumes a fairly basic doctrinal framework. The
plaintiff must first demonstrate the restraint has out-of-state effects.
Once the plaintiff has demonstrated those effects, the burden then
shifts to the state to show that its interest in regulating is sufficiently
strong to overcome the burdens placed on out-of-state citizens. Courts
should consider a number of factors, including any parallel federal
regulations, the necessity and of a restraint, and if the restraint is in an
area of traditional state competence. This is not an exhaustive list of
considerations but rather a starting point. If a plaintiff successfully
shows that a regulation imposes unreasonable costs on out-of-state
118. Meese, supra note 66, at 2192.
119. Id. at 2191.
120. Such a test borrows from Justice Blackmun’s approach in Cantor and from the Court’s
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
121. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007)
(describing how enforcement of the Sherman Act evolves with changing economic times).
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citizens, the federalism concerns that would normally endow the state
with immunity are gone. All that is left is a restraint on trade,
undeserving of protection on federalism grounds.
States can offer a number of rationales to defend their legislation.
These rationales might include economic analyses. But the test should
not constitute a purely economic cost-benefit analysis. Courts are not
to only consider economic benefits, but also respect for states as
sovereigns. For example, similar to the balancing test in Pike, the court
should consider the local benefits generated by state regulation.122 Pike
itself concerned the labeling of cantaloupes.123 The Court recognized
food labeling as an area of traditional state competence, as part of
promoting public health and safety, and thus an extension of state
sovereignty.124
Both the existence of a state interest and the strength of that
interest ought to factor into the interest-balancing calculus.125 If states
are regulating in areas where they have a legitimate interest, they
should be better insulated from antitrust scrutiny. However, if a state is
regulating in such a way that imposes externalities on other states and
does not serve a legitimate state interest, the state should not be
shielded from antitrust scrutiny.126 On the other hand, if the restraint is
the least restrictive means for achieving a state goal, or the restraint is
particularly effective at achieving a goal, a greater showing of out-ofstate effects could be required to hold the restraint invalid.127
Further, a state may argue that its legislation restraining trade
serves the national interest. That national interest can be demonstrated
by examples of federal cooperation with the program or parallel federal
legislation. This consideration was present in Parker but has been
largely ignored by the Court since.128 If, as was the case in Parker, a state
restraint mirrors federal legislation in a particular area, then the federal
goal of promoting competition is pre-empted by another federal goal,
and the state restraint stands on stronger ground. Because California’s
122. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142–44 (1970).
123. Id. at 138.
124. Id.
125. If no legitimate state interest exists, as suggested in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428
U.S. 579, 613 (Blackmun, J., concurring), the balancing test will be rather simple, with the test
likely finding the regulation invalid.
126. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 361 (1977).
127. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 99 (1980)
(noting a retail price maintenance scheme for wine did not achieve either of the interests the state
offered).
128. 317 U.S. 341, 367 (1943).
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program in Parker was analogous to the federal agricultural price
stability program, the federal pro-competitive policy embodied by the
Sherman Act was superseded by another federal interest, and the
state’s policy thus did not disturb that superseding federal goal.
However, while parallel federal legislation would significantly
bolster a state regulation’s position, it is not necessary to show parallel
federal legislation to prevail. For instance, if the state restraint remedies
a market failure or otherwise improves economic efficiency, the
restraint stands on firmer ground. California was faced with a national
problem in Parker but was nevertheless competent to solve the
problem on its own.129 The federal government should not displace
state legislation when the legislation properly solves a national issue. If
the crux of a national issue, like fluctuating raisin prices, can be
adequately solved by one state, there is no need for federal interference
in the issue. Indeed, not all externalities are negative.
On the other hand, a regulation’s out-of-state effects may weigh
against the state. These can take the form of spillover costs, collective
action problems, and other burdens on interstate commerce. States are,
almost by definition, incompetent to solve collective action problems
that extend beyond their borders. A state restraint is more vulnerable
to invalidation the more it imposes burdens on other states. Such
burdens and collective action are not unique to localized regulations,
so this balancing test would largely serve to protect states’ interest in
regulating local matters. For example, recent Court decisions
concerning Parker involved peer-review proceedings at a single
hospital,130 sewage treatment surrounding one city in one state,131 and
cable TV regulations in one city.132 Each was local enough to stave off
concerns of out-of-state effects.
But the absence of an interstate collective action problem should
not end the analysis. Simply because a market failure or some sort of
interstate collective action problem does not exist does not mean the
state regulation should automatically prevail. If the regulation’s
negative interstate effects outweigh any local benefit, even if not in a
“significant way,” the regulation still ought to lose antitrust immunity.
However, this side of the test should not consider intrastate effects of a
regulation, or a collective action problem that occurs within a single
129.
130.
131.
132.

Parker, 317 U.S. at 367 (1943).
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 627 (1992).
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 36 (1985).
Community Comm. Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
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state. These burdens are entrusted to a state’s political system. If a state
decides to displace competition within its borders, and the effects do
not cross state lines, it is up to the citizens to hold their representatives
accountable if they disagree with that decision.133
V. DISCUSSION
For a test case, consider California Retail Liquor Dealers
Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., where state regulations set “an
effective price schedule or effective fair-trade contract” for wine being
sold in certain transaction areas.134 At the time, such resale price
coordination (by private actors) was per se illegal under the Sherman
Act.135 The Court rejected a Parker immunity defense because the state
had not actively supervised the price maintenance.136 However,
assuming a similar scenario where California does actively supervise
the resale price maintenance, the policy is still unlikely to survive the
proposed test. Applying this test, a Court would first note any out-ofstate effects the regulation has. While the specific scope of out-of-state
effects were undetermined, there was no dispute that the California
statute had at least some out-of-state effects. The Court would need to
consider the specific facts of a case in order to properly balance the
countervailing interests. The Court would also take into account the
State’s interest in the regulation. In Midcal, the state offered
“promoting temperance and orderly market conditions” as the relevant
state interests.137 The first interest, temperance (or reducing people’s
alcohol consumption), is not promoted by such a scheme.138 Further,
the Supreme Court noted findings by the California Supreme Court
that fair trade laws enjoyed little justification to continue.139 The state
enacted the resale price maintenance scheme in order to protect small
licensees from predatory pricing policies of large retailers.140 However,
133. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992) (“[S]tates must
accept political responsibility for the actions they intend to undertake.”).
134. 445 U.S. 97, 99 (1980).
135. Id. at 102–03; but see Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877,
899 (2007) (holding resale price maintenance schemes no longer per se illegal). Resale price
maintenance schemes involve resellers agreeing to sell a manufacturers’ product either above a
price floor or below a price ceiling.
136. Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105–06.
137. Id. at 112.
138. Id. (noting liquor consumption went up 42% while resale price maintenance was in
effect).
139. Id. at 113.
140. Id. at 112–13. Predatory pricing schemes involve a company charging below some unit
of cost, hoping to create an unsustainable market condition that causes other competitors to exit
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the state interest itself was not advanced by such a scheme.141
Additionally, no federal legislation paralleled the California
scheme.142 This case would thus be an easy one for balancing concerns.
The state has no legitimate, practical interest in maintaining the resale
price maintenance scheme, and the federal interest in competition and
burdens on out-of-state citizens outweigh the non-existent state
interest. A more difficult case would arise where the wine pricing
scheme actually did achieve state objectives. But if that were the case,
the plaintiff would still have strong grounds to challenge the pricing
scheme. For instance, they could first present less restrictive means to
accomplish those goals, since the temperance movement in the United
States is not short on methods to discourage alcohol consumption.143
Moreover, “orderly market conditions” could possibly be achieved by
a number of different strategies with less negative impact out-of-state.
Under this proposed test, if a state restraint impermissibly imposes
its costs on other states, it merely loses its Parker immunity. The statute
would then be subject to general review under antitrust law. Although
many of the restraints mentioned would likely violate general review
in antitrust courts,144 states will still have an additional opportunity to
defend their regulations under rule of reason analysis. Such cases are
not likely to be successful for the state, however. Rule of reason analysis
only covers competitive harms and benefits, not general social welfare
benefits.145 Once a state statute is shown to impermissibly burden
interstate commerce, it is likely going to be held invalid under any
antitrust scrutiny. This is a feature of this test, not a bug. Once the
federalism principles underlying Parker have been undermined or
shown to be outweighed by the interest in national unity and
competition, all that is left is a restraint on trade. It ceases to become a
state regulation worthy of protection on federalism grounds and
the market, where the company can then reap the benefits of a more concentrated market.
141. See id. (describing findings of fact by the California Supreme Court that showed
California’s scheme did not achieve its intended objective).
142. See id. at 110–13 (offering no federal interest in the state regime).
143. See Alice W. Campbell, Temperance Movement, VCU LIBRARIES SOC. WELFARE
PROJECT
(2017),
https://socialwelfare.library.vcu.edu/religious/the-temperance-movement/
(describing a number of ways temperance was promoted in the United States).
144. See, e.g., Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943) (assuming that the raisin prorate
program would be illegal if done by private parties).
145. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (“In either
event, the purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the competitive significance of the
restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in
the interest of the members of an industry. Subject to exceptions defined by statute, that policy
decision has been made by the Congress”).
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becomes a restraint subject to rule of reason review.
Such review would not transform antitrust courts into Lochner era
tribunals passing judgment on the wisdom of state restraints.146 The goal
of a courts’ review of this proposed test would not be to ask, “is this
statute economically efficient?” but rather “does this statute offend the
principles of national unity and impermissibly burden interstate
commerce?” Principles of national unity underpin a number of existing
constitutional doctrines. This approach to the Parker doctrine, where
state regulations that create significant collective action problems fall
under antitrust scrutiny, best aligns with the constitutional ideal of
interstate harmony.
Outside of the antitrust sphere, constitutional doctrine exists in
order to foster harmony within the union and between states. In fact, a
number of state economic regulations inspired the creation of a
national commerce clause.147 The cycle of states abusing their discretion
to support their economic self-interest is as old as the Union itself. For
example, while not a monopoly, New York’s independence in setting
tariff rates that benefitted New York is one cited reason for a
Constitution granting a strong commerce power in the federal
government.148 The Constitution set up a national market to defeat
economic provincialism.149 The Sherman Act, the free market charter
for the United States, should do the same.150 While state regulation and
sovereignty are crucial to a healthy system of federalism, the Court has
not shied away from enforcing limits on state’s abilities to harass each
other as co-equal sovereigns. By preventing state-action immunity from
covering restraints that create excessive interstate conflicts, the
Sherman Act can promote constitutional ideals and interstate harmony
as well.
The primary remedy to a violation of the proposed test should not
be treble damages, but an injunction prohibiting the conduct from
continuing. One of the hallmarks of antitrust enforcement is the
146. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 166 (1996) (describing the vices of the
Lochner era).
147. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S.Ct. 2080, 2089 (“[T]he Commerce Clause
‘reflect[s] a central concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the
Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to
avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the
Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation.’”).
148. GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, WE HAVE NOT A GOVERNMENT: THE ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION AND THE ROAD TO THE CONSTITUTION 260–64 (2017).
149. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 453 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
150. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
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possibility of treble damages.151 However, while concerns with antitrust
law mainly focus on harm to consumers and the competitive process,
this paper’s concerns with the Parker doctrine involve constitutional
issues of national unity and free markets. Because states should not be
subject to the threat of treble damages for every statute they pass, the
adequate remedy would be to prohibit the state from continuing to
burden out-of-state citizens, not pay those citizens triple damages. A
state legislating for the public good, which then burdens interstate
commerce, invokes very different concerns than a group of competitors
conspiring to fix prices. Where treble damages seek to punish profitmaximizing individuals from benefiting from anti-competitive
activities,152 the balancing test proposed above seeks to preserve the
federal balance rather than demarcate and penalize states. Further,
threatening public bodies with treble damages might deter states from
passing legitimate local legislation for fears that the state would need
to pay treble damages.153
This revision of the Parker doctrine better aligns it with modern
economic theory. As a general principle, the more a sovereign is able to
internalize the benefits and costs of some regulation, the more efficient
the economic regulation will be.154 While the current Parker doctrine
does not consider the internalization principle at all, this proposed
solution allows antitrust suits to correct interstate burdens that become
too severe. Congress has already legislated and made its policies clear
through the Sherman Act: namely, promoting free markets and
competition.155 Thus, if a state restraint places burdens onto other states
where the restraining state is not politically accountable, the body that
can best internalize those costs, Congress, has decided to promote
competition.156 The policy promoting competition would then overrule

151. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (“[A]nd shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained”).
152. Wiley Jr., supra note 70, at 789 n.287.
153. Id.
154. Herbert Hovenkamp & John A. MacKerron III, Municipal Regulation and Federal
Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L. REV. 719, 720 (1985); see also Cooter & Siegel, supra note 75, at
137–38 (describing the theory of the internalization principle).
155. City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(“[A]ntitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free
enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our freeenterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal
freedoms.”)
156. Standard Oil Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 340 U.S. 231, 253–54 (1951) (Reed, J.,
dissenting) (“The public policy of the United States fosters the free-enterprise system of
unfettered competition among producers and distributors of goods as the accepted method to put
those goods into the hands of all consumers at the least expense.”).
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any state interest in regulation. The state could lobby Congress to
codify antitrust immunity, in which case the whole nation, which would
bear the costs and benefits of such a program, could decide if it was in
its best interest through their elected Congressional representatives.
CONCLUSION
The Parker doctrine exists to ensure that states may regulate and
impose anti-competitive restraints without fear of antitrust scrutiny. In
this sense, it represents a reverse preemption where a state’s regulation
preempts the federal interest in promoting competition. Beginning with
the immunity of a raisin cartel in the 1940s, the doctrine has largely
remained intact without many alterations to present day. However, the
doctrine is not without problems. From an economic standpoint, it
shields regulations that are not efficient and allows a small number of
producers to accrue benefits at the cost of many consumers. Further,
the doctrine also encourages inefficient results from a political
standpoint. Not only do spillovers create incentives for political actors
to off-load costs to citizens that cannot vote them out, but those who
bear the costs have no other redress to resolve their issues. Even if
consumers did have a method of redress, a free-rider problem prevents
groups from effectively advocating for solutions. These problems have
been noted by a number of scholars, and many solutions have been
presented.
This paper proposes that the Supreme Court adopt a balancing test
to determine whether or not a restraint on trade ought to be entitled to
Parker doctrine immunity. Courts should balance the necessity and
efficacy of a state regulation against the severity of out-of-state
spillovers and collective action problems that regulation creates. If a
court determines that the benefits of such a regulation are not
outweighed by the potential harms to out-of-state consumers and
interstate commerce, the court should permit the regulation to stand. If
a state regulation is not entitled to immunity, the state may still petition
Congress to grant antitrust immunity to the conduct in question. This
balancing test would still allow states to regulate issues that arise within
their borders but would curtail their ability to impose excessive costs
across the nation in pursuit of those efforts. In turn, this harmonizes the
Parker doctrine with America’s unique federalist system, while also
promoting economic and political efficiency.

